by Eyck Freymann
This post was written as a follow-up to Part 1.
Nuclear arms in the hands of stable nations are a weird and modern addition to the strategic canon. After the US developed the bomb in 1945 (and before the Russians followed in 1949) we thought the world was going our way. Russia was trying to seize Eastern Europe, but surely our infinitely superior firepower would allow us to get our way. CONTINUED: Click "Read More"
The Truman administration learned the hard way that this is not the case. Something about the unimaginable devastation caused by nuclear weaponry very quickly limits its use to deterrent status. In other words, there comes a time when using the bombs is out of the question because it would result in unacceptable losses.
Our weapons system is purely placebo. If we were involved in a conflict with Russia, it would make no difference to them if we had ten bombs or ten thousand. The nation could not survive without its ten largest cities.
Of course, the potential uses of these weapons is becoming increasingly confusing in an era in which we are fighting not a nation with recognized boundaries but rather a multinational idealogical group. The focus in terms of winning this so-called "War on Terror" should (in it's military aspect) be on precision weaponry rather than nuclear. We know that al Qaeda is operating in north-east Afghanistan and northern Pakistan. Can we nuke them? No.
If we really want to win the "War on Terror" then we should pursue dialogue. We need the help and cooperation of Arab states such as Iran and Syria if we are to limit the spread of terror.
Iran is a moderate people represented by a radical government. Syria is similar. If we continue to be hostile and uninterested in dialogue, we can always expect these states to spawn terrorist cells.
The way of the future is not in war between states, it is in cooperation between them. I wish the Bush administration had understood this.
Wednesday, November 12, 2008
The Dangers of Nuclear Arms, Part 2
Labels: nuclear, Russia, war on terror, World War II, Young Sentinel
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3 comments:
There's a simple theory behind nuclear strategy: more is better. I don't like it, but it's the truth. You say a nation can't survive without it's ten biggest cities? If, in a first strike, a nation's ten missiles were destroyed, then what? I don't like the nuclear bomb, as far as the real world goes. I can only urge a Strategic Defense Initiative: shoot down the missiles BEFORE they hit their targets. It makes far more sense than this meaningless "shoot me, and I shoot back" nonsense. We need to watch the rouge states. Not have a missile on them. WATCH them. They are not afraid to sell WMDs to terrorists. But I still believe that a terrorist that needs commercial jets as missiles cannot make his own A-bomb. A dirty bomb is far more likely.
I agree with wasdcdemocrat: we are much more likely to face a dirty bomb attack than a nuclear attack.
Nuclear strategy is not a strategy. The DOD creates reports that project possible futures after nuclear conflict. These are quantified in terms of
a) percentage of population killed
b) percentage of industry destroyed
There are certain levels which change from country to country, posited internally by our Defense Department, that model the number of successful hits needed to render losses unacceptable.
I tell you again, it is purely placebo. There is no difference between ten bombs or a hundred or a thousand or ten thousand. We spent decades in an arms race with the Russians. What no one realized was that the number of weapons is effectively meaningless. For all intent and purposes, the loss of a single city, Moscow, would be unacceptable for Russia.
Star Wars, like nuclear stockpiles, is a bunch of hooey. It's a pretend indomitable safeguard that would allow Americans to live their lives free of the fear of MAD. In reality, there is no sane way to test and no economically feasible strategy for such a plan.
Call me cynical. I'm a realist on these matters.
Trust me: I've studied war, particularly post-WWII. We must at least have anti-missile systems on the ground as an alternative to MAD. We have the capability: the Patiot surface-to-air missile has has an anti-missile capability demonstrated in the Gulf. The Ticonderoga-class misssile cruiser can (I believe) be adapted to have anti-missile and even anti-satellite capabilities. However, I have to disagree with you on two things:
1) The number of weapons stockpiled is not meaningless, because (as I've said before), just as a nation losing its ten biggest cities in a first strike is crippling, so would losing its ten only missiles.
2)The destruction of a capitol city would be unacceptable only in a complete surprise attack. "Continuity of government" would allow the government to carry out its jobs from land- or air-based command posts.
But the arguing is pointless. We all know that the danger is real, and that we can stil be vulnerable.
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